

NOTES ON THE FAILURE OF THE SECOND ATHENIAN CONFEDERACY

IN one sense the Second Athenian Confederacy¹ did not fail. It was simply abolished in 338 by Philip in the Peace of Demades (Paus. i 25.3), but up till then it continued actively enough. In 346 we see the *synedrion* engaged in the deliberations on the Peace of Philokrates (Aisch. ii 60, 86; iii 69–70, 74); a Tenedian went on both the embassies to Philip, representing the allies (Aisch. ii 20, 97, 126); the Peace was made by Philip with Athens and her allies, i.e. the Confederacy. In 346 Mytilene chose to resume membership (*GHI* 168) and in 343 the *synedroi* were available in Athens to give evidence about the events of 346 (Aisch. ii 86). In the later 340s, as the fifty-eighth speech of the Demosthenic Corpus shows (*cf.* §§37–8, 53–6), the machinery of the Confederacy continued to work, and the impression gained from the two surviving decrees which concern the Tenedians (*GHI* 175, and *IG* ii² 232) is of willing co-operation between allies and hegemon.

However, it seems plain enough that after the Social War the Confederacy was of very little importance. *Syntaxeis* continued to be paid, and collected by generals,² but, for the rest, apart from the events of 346 the Confederacy is conspicuously absent. I do not refer to the absence of the allies from what we know of the military operations of this period. They are indeed absent from the various relief forces sent to Olynthos in 349/8 (Philoch. FF 49–51), just as they appear to be absent from the operations of 341 (Philoch. FF 159, 160) and for that matter from the attempt to save Euboia in 348 (*cf.* Plut. *Phok.* 12). Demosthenes in the *First Philippic* outlined plans for the conduct of the war for Amphipolis, in which the allies make no appearance whatsoever. But this is not important. Athens had plenty of ships; they were needed to get soldiers to the north, but the war was not really a naval war and, speaking generally, she used mercenaries; all she needed from the allies was money to pay them, which she got. Indeed there is no evidence that Athens relied on allied military aid in the 360s.³ What is remarkable is the total omission of any reference to the Confederacy in the symbouleutic speeches of the period. One would have thought, for instance, that the attitude of the *synedrion* was relevant in the discussion of the Rhodian appeal in 351/0. Some had argued for just dealing, in accordance with the terms of the peace made at the end of the Social War (Dem. xv 25–9). Demosthenes dismissed the argument, not by declaring that the allies favoured help for the Rhodian democrats, nor by arguing that to help the Rhodians would be congenial and useful to the Confederacy, but simply by denying that the ‘just’ argument had any force; the allies of the Confederacy did not come into it. Likewise in his passionate appeals of the late 340s when he was trying to arouse both his fellow-citizens and his fellow Greeks, one looks in vain for any argument based on the attitude

¹ Modern discussion starts from S. Accame, *La Lega Ateniense* (Rome 1941) (hereafter Accame). In *CQ* xxiii (1973) 47–60 I discussed the foundation of the Confederacy. The following abbreviations are used to refer to recent discussions relevant to this article (listed in chronological order). (1) Woodhead: A. G. Woodhead, ‘*IG* ii² 43 and Jason of Pherae’, *AJA* lxi (1957) 367–73. (2) Sealey: B. R. I. Sealey, ‘*IG* ii² 1609 and the transformation of the second Athenian sea-league’, *Phoenix* xi (1957) 95–111. (3) Burnett–Edmondson: A. P. Burnett and C. N. Edmondson, ‘The Chabrias Monument in the Athenian Agora’, *Hesp.* xxx (1961) 74–91. (4) Woodhead: A. G. Woodhead, ‘Chabrias, Timotheus and the Aegean allies’, *Phoenix* xvi (1962) 258–66. (5) Cawkwell: G. L. Cawkwell, ‘Notes on the Peace of 375/4’, *Historia* xii (1963) 84–95. (6) Coleman–Bradeen: J. E. Coleman and D. W. Bradeen, ‘Thera on *IG* ii² 43’, *Hesp.* xxxvi (1967) 102–4. (7) Davies: J. K. Davies, ‘The date of *IG* ii² 1609’, *Historia* xviii (1969)

309–33. (8) Cawkwell: G. L. Cawkwell, ‘The date of *IG* ii² 1609 again’, *Historia* xxii (1973) 759–61. (9) Griffith: G. T. Griffith, ‘Athens in the fourth century’, *Imperialism in the Ancient World*, ed. P. D. A. Garnsey and C. R. Whittaker (Cambridge 1978) 127–44.

² *Cf.* Dem. viii 21, 24–6; Aisch. ii 71, iii 91, 100; *GHI* 168, 175; *IG* ii² 207 (but see M. J. Osborne, *BSA* lxxvi [1971] 297–321).

³ G. Busolt, *Der zweite athenische Bund* (Leipzig 1874) 730 ff. did not distinguish the periods before and after the Peace of 372/1. The only passage he cited relevant to the question of whether there were allied contingents in Athenian armies and navies is [Dem.] I 14, but the fact that rowers deserted to Thasian and Maroneian ships does not prove that they were serving with the fleet. We know that the rebel allies of 357 had ships (Diod. xvi 7), but there is nothing to suggest that any were serving with Chares in 357/6 (Dem. xxiii 173).

or usefulness of the Confederacy. The truth is that for almost two decades the Confederacy merely survived, of little importance in its own eyes or the Athenians' or anyone else's.

It was not so before the Social War. When Epameinondas broached his plans for Theban naval hegemony (Diod. xv 78.4, 79.1–2), he declared that Thebes could be as Sparta was in the Persian Wars, possessing few ships herself but commanding a large allied naval force, and the appeals he directed to Rhodes, Chios and Byzantium were presumably made to the cities which would provide the necessary ships.⁴ It is unclear how many these actually were in the 360s. The great days of Rhodian naval power were yet to come (*cf.* Polyb. iv 47.1 for the third century), and the only precise evidence for the fourth century is of small squadrons of ten ships only (Arr. *Anab.* ii 20, Diod. xix 77.2). Likewise for Chios precision is lacking. But in the Social War the Chians, Rhodians and Byzantines 'with their allies' put out a combined fleet of one hundred ships (Diod. xvi 21.2) and presumably this was not their full strength. How much 'the allies', notably Mausolos, contributed is unknown; there is much uncertainty about the fleet of one hundred ships he is said to have had in the mid-360s (Xen. *Ages.* 2.26) and in any case they are unlikely to have survived the economies of Artaxerxes Ochus at the start of his reign (Schol. Dem. iv 19). So the fleet of one hundred ships that confronted Chares in 356 (Diod. *loc. cit.*) was probably very largely provided by the revolting members of the Confederacy, and represents faithfully enough the power which Epameinondas hoped to win over. Whether other members maintained fleets of any magnitude is uncertain.⁵ Epameinondas may have appealed only to those from whom he could expect a favourable reception. The Mytilenaians had shared in the war against Sparta (*GHI* 131), presumably on sea, and perhaps still had ships, even if Athens did not call on her to use them. There was at any rate still sufficient military potential in the Confederacy to make it a considerable force politically. The Social War was the real turning point and it is proper to see its conclusion as the failure of the Confederacy.

Why then did it fail? The evidence is scrappy, its significance often unclear, and no firm answer can be given. But points can be made and the area of uncertainty delimited. The following notes aim to elucidate, if not fully answer, the question why the Confederacy failed.

THE *BLÜTEZEIT* OF THE CONFEDERACY, 378–371

Until Leuktra, the Confederacy flourished, reaching its largest by 373, by voluntary, not compulsory, additions; and furthermore there is no sign that the compact of 378/7 was not honoured. That is the burden of this note.

The history of the extension of the Confederacy is to be traced in the listing of the names on the *stèle* recording the decree of Aristotle (*GHI* 123), but only incompletely, for there were recorded no more than 58 names whereas, if we may trust Diodoros, there were in all 75 members.⁶ When did the cities whose names are not recorded enter the Confederacy? If the names listed on the left side of the *stèle* represent the adhesions of 373 as well as 375, almost inevitably one is forced to the conclusion that the Confederacy continued to grow after Leuktra, but if they represent only 375, the Confederacy may well have reached its largest by Leuktra. In either case the problem remains of why the missing names were not recorded.

Since Accame's full (and masterly) discussion, two important points have been made. The first concerns the entry 'the *demos* of the Zakynthians which is in Nellos' which is the last of the names on the left side but at a considerable interval below the one above it and exactly aligned with the first names recorded on the front face. It was supposed that this entry furnished a

⁴ Cf. CQ xxii (1972) 270, 271.

⁵ For Thasian and Maroneian ships, [Dem.] I 14. The Maroneians needed help in conveying corn-ships (*ibid.* 20), which does not suggest they had many. For allied naval contingents before 371, *cf.* Xen. *Hell.* vi 2.9, Diod.

xv 47, Dem. xlix 14–16, 49 and IG ii² 1607. 49, 155.

⁶ At xv 28.3 (4 names), 27.7 (1), 30.2 (70)—added together, they equal the figure given by Aisch. ii 70 (in part of a wildly exaggerated statement).

terminus ante quem for all the adhesions recorded on the left face, but its place suggests rather that it was put there on the *stèle* because it would not fit into the space on the front provided by the original stone-cutter and before the cutting of other names on the left face was even contemplated.⁷ The second point concerns the entry at the top of the left face. The casually accepted supplement of 'the *demos* of the Kerkyraians' has been shown to be impossible.⁸ There is simply insufficient space on the stone for the supplementation of ---]ραίων to read [Κερκυ]ραίων, and this must be abandoned. Coleman and Bradeen suggested that the right supplementation is [Θη]ραίων and it is hard to imagine what else it could have been. There is some reason to believe that Thera did at some moment become a member,⁹ and there is no other name known of the right length, which is remotely probable. But what has happened to Kerkyra, the acquisition of which by Timotheos is placed by Xenophon (*Hell.* v 4.64) in 375 before the battle of Alyzeia? Furthermore, a decree of the second prytany of 375/4 (say August 375) authorised the addition of the names of the Kerkyraians, Akarnanians and Kephallenians to 'the common *stèle* of the allies' (*GHI* 126). The 'Akarnanians' and 'Pronnoi of the Kephallenians' are successive entries. What has happened to the Kerkyraians?

It is hard to believe that they were simply omitted. The instructions of the Athenian *demos* were not lightly to be disregarded. It seems better to find a place on the stone for Kerkyra, and in view of the power and importance of that city one may suggest that a place was found on the front face of the *stèle*, where the word Κερκυραῖοι was easily fitted in. Nor does this suggestion corrupt the argument from the position of the entry concerning Zakynthos, which was too large to be fitted into the space available on the front. The adhesion of the Zakynthian *demos* in Nellos can still be supposed to have been prior to the events of 375 which the left side reflects.

But does the listing of names on the left side reflect the events of 375 only? Or does it contain names relating to 373 as well? The starting point of the discussion is still what it has been for ninety years¹⁰—*viz* that all the names above the Zakynthian entry were cut by the same stone-cutter. As far as I know this has never been challenged, save on one minor point. Coleman and Bradeen asserted¹¹ that the first entry 'is in a different hand from the names below it'; if this is correct, it supports their proposed restoration of Thera, which would in all likelihood have joined in the year of the battle of Naxos rather than in 375 if it joined at all in this period.¹² But, for the rest, the start of the problem remains the same, until it is challenged by an expert epigraphist. All the names in question were cut by the same hand. Were they cut at much the same time?

It has been freely presumed that in the listing of these names one may trace the progress of Athenian generals through the waters of the Aegean and the Ionian Sea.¹³ Since at the top of the left side there are a number of north Aegean cities (Abdera, Thasos, the Chalkidians of Thrace, Ainos, Samothrace, and Dikaiopolis¹⁴), then at the bottom another group which contains Elaious, Selymbria, Dion, Neapolis with Cycladic names interspersed, and a bit further up the two Lesbian cities of Antissa and Eresos, the theory has been held that the left side reflects two separate expeditions into Aegean waters, that of Chabrias in early 375 (*Diod.* xv 36) and that of Timotheos in 373 (*Diod.* xv 47.2).¹⁵ The presumption is unjustified. There must have been some voluntary accessions. If Accame is right in his denial that there was a city of Euboeia named Arethousa (and certainly apart from a dubitable reference in Stephanus Byzantinus no such city in Euboeia is ever so much as mentioned), and if the Arethousa known to us as inland in the Thracian region is the city named between Eretria and Karystos on the front face,¹⁶ it must have

⁷ Cf. (1) Woodhead 371 n. 15, (2) Sealey 105.

⁸ (6) Coleman-Bradeen.

⁹ Cf. *IG* ii² 179 fr. c lines 9-11.

¹⁰ Cf. E. Fabricius, *RhM* xlvi (1891) 589 ff.

¹¹ (6) Coleman-Bradeen 104.

¹² 'The *demos* of the Theraians' was, presumably, placed on the left side before 'the Kerkyraians' was added to the front because there was not enough room

on the front for a two-line entry.

¹³ Cf. e.g. (3) Burnett-Edmondson 83.

¹⁴ For location, cf. *ATL* i 482.

¹⁵ Cf. (4) Woodhead.

¹⁶ Accame 72 f. For location of Arethousa, see N. G. L. Hammond, *History of Macedonia* (Oxford 1972) i 196. It does not occur on the Athenian tribute lists, but in the fourth century it developed some outside contacts; cf.

joined of its own accord, for no recorded or conceivable Athenian expedition is in the least likely to have penetrated that far from the coast. Again if the Ikians of line 84 did not join voluntarily, one would expect to find them in the group of names that contains their neighbours, the Peparethians and the Skiathians. One must remark too the fitfulness of the accessions from northern waters. If Perinthos and Maroneia were the fruits of some recruiting voyage, one would expect Selymbria, twenty miles along the coast from the former, and Abdera, again twenty miles from the latter, to be recruited at the same moment, but Perinthos and Maroneia joined, it would seem, in 376 or earlier, and Selymbria and Abdera in 375 or later. The basis of the Confederacy, at least in its earliest phase, was voluntary (*cf.* lines 15–19 of the decree of Aristotle). The Euboian states joined ‘most eagerly’ and the expedition sent out under Chabrias in 377 was to protect allies already enrolled, not to coerce the recalcitrant (Diod. xv 30 and *cf.* *GHI* 124.10–13). Indeed the presence of Hestiaia amongst the names on the left side is suggestive. In 377 Chabrias ravaged the territory of Hestiaia, which was at that moment pro-Spartan in sympathy, and established a garrison at a nearby strong-point (Diod. xv 30), but no recorded expedition is linked with Hestiaia in 375 and it seems likely that the city acceded to the Confederacy of its own free choice. Thus the attempt closely to link the names listed on the left side with the two known expeditions of Chabrias in the northern Aegean should be abandoned. We may be confronted by a large number of voluntary accessions which sufficiently closely coincided in time to be engraved at much the same moment by the same stone-cutter’s chisel.

Indeed it is somewhat more likely that the same hand cut this group of names at much the same time than in two different years. The groups of names on the front face were not assigned to the same stone-cutter, and good reason would have to be given for holding that there are two temporally distinct groups on the left side cut by the same hand. No good reason has, to my mind, been advanced. It is true that, if all the names belong to 375, the cities won over by Timotheos in 373 were not recorded, but the Athenians stopped recording at some time which may as well have been after 375 as after 373.

There is, after all, a satisfactory explanation of why so many cities should have joined in 375, and at much the same moment. The decree of alliance with Kerkyra, Akarnania and Kephallenia (*GHI* 126) was passed in the second prytany of 375/4, i.e. some time after the sixth day of Metageitnion. The festival of Peace, which seems to have celebrated Athens’ great triumph, coincided with the festival of the *Synoikia* which fell on the sixteenth of Hekatombaion (Schol. Ar. *Pax* 1019), and, if it is right to suppose that that day was chosen because the peace was concluded at Sparta on that day or shortly before,¹⁷ the two Athenian ambassadors who went directly from Sparta to recall Timotheos (Xen. *Hell.* vi 2.2) would have got him back to Athens in Metageitnion, bringing with him, just as he brought in 373 (Diod. xv 47.3), the ambassadors of the cities that wished to join the Confederacy. Shortly before, at the festival of the Panathenaia, held in the last days of Hekatombaion,¹⁸ the ambassadors of other cities wishing to join may have been present to seek admission when normal business resumed. The Peace of 375 was a renewal of the King’s Peace (Philoch. F 151), and a general summons to Sparta to hear the Royal Rescript was probably enough issued earlier in 375. Experience of how Sparta had conducted herself under the King’s Peace could well have suggested to a wide range of Greek cities that if the King’s Peace was to be renewed it would be well to join the Second Athenian Confederacy which had begun during that peace, and those who attended Sparta for the Peace but wished also to join the Confederacy could well have passed almost in a body to Athens. The news of Timotheos’ great victory at Alyzeia on the twelfth of Skirophorion, which played so decisive a part in securing Athens a position in the Peace which she had lacked in 387/6, would have done nothing to check their enthusiasm. If the Athenian fleet was to have free range of the

IG iv². 1 94, where it is represented in the list of *thearodokoi* at Epidaurus. Peace of 375/4 B.C., *GRBS* xii (1971) 353–61.

¹⁷ *Cf.* (5) Cawkwell and J. Buckler, ‘Dating the

¹⁸ *Cf.* L. Deubner, *Attische Feste* (Berlin 1932) 23.

Aegean, it would be even better sense to seek the protection of the provisions of the decree of Aristotle. Thus one can well understand how and why so many states should be applying at much the same moment for membership, and so engaging the chisel of the man who engraved the names of the left side.

An argument of a sort in favour of some of the accessions falling in 373 has been derived from the erased name in line 111. If that name was indeed Jason, and if Jason did shortly before spring 375 say what Polydamas of Pharsalos is represented by Xenophon (*Hell.* vi 1.10) as saying that Jason said, his decision within a few months to join the Confederacy would, it has been thought, be so unlikely as to make it probable that he joined in 373. This argument seems to me quite unsound, though both its premises are in my view correct. About the membership of Jason opinion has greatly divided.¹⁹ According to the latest utterance,²⁰ 'Woodhead (*AJA* lxi [1957] 367 ff.) shows conclusively that there is really no good reason for thinking that the restoration of Jason . . . can possibly be right', 'Jason was never a member'. But the names on the left side are not *stoichedon*, and occupy varying amounts of space per letter.²¹ Consideration of spaces 'shows conclusively' nothing, and there is a strong probability that Jason and Alketas, who were both allies according to Apollodorus (*Dem.* xlix 10), were allies of the same sort. So it remains probable enough that the name below Alketas and his son Neoptolemos was indeed Jason. Nor is the argument that Xenophon has misplaced the appeal of Polydamas persuasive. Polydamas, as Spartan *proxenos* (*Xen. Hell.* vi 1.4), was probably enough a familiar figure at Sparta and so known to Xenophon. It is notable that such Thessalian history of the 370s as gets into the *Hellenica* is Pharsalian or, rather, seen through Pharsalian eyes, which suggests that Polydamas and his family were the source of Xenophon's information.²² So one would need good reason to argue that the Pharsalian appeal is misplaced. The argument is, in fact, rather the other way. Jason was an ally of Athens of some sort or other by 373 (*Dem. loc. cit.*), and the remark credited to Jason about not wanting alliance with Athens would be inexplicable in a speech of 372/1. Nor is much attention due to the claim made by Jason, as reported and endorsed by Polydamas, to the effect that the Dolopians and Alketas, 'the subordinate commander in Epeiros' (*ὑπαρχος*), were 'subject to him' (*Xen. Hell.* vi 1.7). Until Jason got control of Pharsalos and indeed was appointed *tagos*, his chances of 'subjecting' anyone across the Pindos range were slight. Perhaps Polydamas was concerned to paint the menace of Jason as vividly as he could. In any case the remark about Alketas is not an argument for putting the speech in 372/1 rather than in 375; whenever it was made, Jason had not yet become *tagos* (*Xen. Hell.* vi 1.18). Polydamas' appeal, therefore, should be left where Xenophon put it, *viz* in early 375. Whether at much the same time, as Xenophon would have us believe (*Hell.* vi 2.2), the Phokians also appealed to Sparta and Kleombrotos was sent out with two thirds of the league army, or not, is an entirely separate question, which can here be left out of account.²³

¹⁹ For discussions see Accame 91–8, and (1) Woodhead. Also M. Sordi, *La Lega Tessala* (Rome 1958) 172–7.

²⁰ (9) Griffith 310 n. 34.

²¹ Cf. (5) Cawkwell 91 n. 60.

²² Cf. my introduction to 1979 edition of the Penguin translation of the *Hellenica* (*A History of my Times*) 26.

²³ Cf. Sordi (n. 19) 170, 171. If the four Spartan divisions under Kleombrotos (*Xen. Hell.* vi 1.1) did indeed cross to Phokis in early 375, Xenophon must simply have missed out their recall and their despatch a second time, perhaps in 372. Quite apart from the often stressed point that it is very unlikely that two thirds of the Spartan army (together with a proportionate share of the Peloponnesian League) would have been abroad for four years, there is the equally strong point that such a garrison would probably enough have had to be recalled under the terms of the Peace of 375. Also one

would have expected events of a different turn when Thebes struck against Plataia and Thespias in 373. If Xenophon omitted the recall and the second despatch, that is no more surprising than if he has misplaced the appeal. The real difficulty about accepting his placing of the despatch of Kleombrotos' army in 375 lies in the account of the battle of Tegyra (*Diod.* xv 37) given in Plutarch's *Pelopidas* 16, from which it emerges that there were two 'divisions' of the Spartan army on garrison duty in Orchomenos, that a replacement force came from Sparta while the original two divisions were in Lokris, that the allied contingent in the army of Kleombrotos according to Xenophon (*Hell.* vi 1.1) is not mentioned, nor is the name of Kleombrotos (*cf.* the recital of his 'failures' in *Xen. Hell.* vi 4.5). All in all, it now seems to me more likely that Xenophon has misplaced the Phokian appeal and that it was in fact made shortly before Leuktra. The Spartan reasons for not helping Polydamas effectively, as given by Xeno-

But if, as I have just argued, Jason was the name erased and Polydamas did in 375 report him as saying that, although the Athenians 'would do anything' to become his ally, he did not think he could 'form a friendship' with them, it by no means follows that his conversion to alliance, which in some form or other certainly did happen, could not have been quite swift. Jason was a man of big ideas (Xen. *Hell.* vi 4.31) and big talk (Isok. v 119), but he had a head for politics. He saw on the battlefield of Leuktra that it was to his advantage that the conflict should not be renewed and that Thebes and Sparta should continue to have each other to fear (Xen. *Hell.* vi 4.22–4). He could equally well have seen that if there was to be a renewal of the King's Peace he had better join in it and, for extra security, the Second Athenian Confederacy as well. Thus there is no proper inference to be drawn from the erasure that would require some of the names on the left side of the decree of Aristotle to represent the fruits of Timotheos' campaign of 373.

The onus of proof is on those who would argue that the names cut by the same hand were cut at two different times. Until more cogent proof is forthcoming it should be conceded that in all likelihood no names were added to the *stele* of the decree of Aristotle after autumn 375.

Two questions therefore arise. First, when did the unrecorded accessions occur? Secondly, why did the Athenians cease to keep the *stele* up to date? Neither can, I fear, be surely answered.

About seventeen are missing from the *stele* (see above). They could well all have joined before Leuktra, just as some certainly did (Diod. xv 47.3). If so, they need not all have joined in 373; volunteers could well have come forward in 372; the peaceful period immediately after the Peace of 375 is perhaps unlikely. But the crucial question is whether there were members added after Leuktra. Accame²⁴ confidently assumed that the places captured by Timotheos in the north Aegean in the 360s but not visited with cleruchies were incorporated in the Confederacy. The list of names of cities he captured in the 360s known to us are these: Samos, Krithote, Sestos, Poteidaia, Torone, Pydna and Methone. (Prokonnesos is explicitly described as an ally of Athens ([Dem.] 15), but the alliance may well have been made in the 370s, and there is nothing to connect Timotheos with its 'capture'.) Of those on Accame's list, although one cannot be sure, it seems hardly likely that any entered the Confederacy. Samos Philip allowed Athens to keep under the Peace of Demades (Diod. xviii 56), when he required the dissolution of the Confederacy; if she had been a member, her exceptional treatment deserved some remark, but there is none (cf. Paus. i 25.3). Krithote and Sestos, being in the Chersonese, were parts of what 'the King and all the Greeks decided was yours' (*ὑμετέραν*) (Dem. ix 16; cf. vii 40); allied status, rather than possession, seems improbable.²⁵ The case of Poteidaia is more obscure, but neither of the decrees touching it gives the faintest hint of membership (*GHI* 146, *IG* ii² 118). Torone was forced by siege to come to terms (Polyain. iii 10.15); of what sort, we can only conjecture. Of Pydna and Methone no more is known beyond the fact that they were captured (Din. i 14, etc.). But there is no hint anywhere that any of the cities were members of the Confederacy. Demosthenes, not necessarily nice about such matters, flatly declared that the Athenians 'once held Pydna, Poteidaia, Methone and this whole surrounding area' (iv 4), no more. Presumably alliances were made (Dem. iii 28 and Schol.), but they may have remained outside the Confederacy. It cannot be proved, unhappily, but, until positive evidence emerges to the contrary, one may posit that after Leuktra no additions were made to the Confederacy.

Why then did the Athenians cease after autumn 375 to record the names of new members? Or rather, since that question cannot be more than very conjecturally answered, what is the

phon (*Hell.* vi 1.17), do not require a larger foreign commitment than the two 'divisions' garrison in Orchomenos mentioned by Plutarch, and there is no good reason to suppose that the Phokian appeal and the appeal of Polydamas are so inextricably connected that one must suppose that, if Xenophon has misplaced the one, he has misplaced the other.

²⁴ Accame 180, where the evidence for Timotheos' captures will be found.

²⁵ It must be admitted that *IG* ii² 126, which in both *GHI* 151 and *ATL* ii 104 is supplemented in lines 8 and 16 by *τὴν σύνταξιν*, might be used to prove that the cities of the Chersonese were in the Confederacy. But one might also supplement *τὴν πρόσσodon* (cf. Dem. xxiii 110)—or, more satisfactorily, *τὰ καθήκοντα* (with *ἅπαντα* in lines 7 and 8). I am not alone in my scepticism about the presently prevailing restoration. Cf. (9) Griffith 313 n. 35.

significance of their ceasing? They certainly did not utterly cease to regard the *stele*, for they took the trouble to have a name erased and, if that name was indeed Jason, they did so after his visit to Athens as ally in 373 (Dem. xlix 10), perhaps when he died in 370 (Xen. *Hell.* vi 4.30–31).²⁶ Nor does their leaving the entry ‘Thebans’ on the stone argue indifference. They may deliberately have left it as a way of showing that Athens did not recognise the existence of the Boiotian state. So the *stele* was not utterly forgotten after 375.²⁷

The only answer one can give is that their neglecting to record the names of 373 does not necessarily mean that the Confederacy had become of secondary importance. It is an error to subject Athenian practices to the sort of scrutiny appropriate to a state with developed chancellery procedures. One has only to look at the great variety of form in the documents of the first Athenian Empire to see that the *demos* did not assert itself in consistent form, let alone in consistent policy. Much depended on the chance of who actually drafted a decree. Indeed in the very period here under discussion there is a striking instance. *GHI* 127 is a crucial document for understanding how the Second Athenian Confederacy worked, but its form is very odd. Kerkyra had been admitted to membership of the Confederacy by a decree, which ordered the name to be added to ‘the common *stele*’ (*GHI* 126.14). Each city was to share in the *synedrion* ‘in accordance with the decrees of the allies’ (lines 22–4). What need then for a separate, undated document spelling out precisely what all this entailed? Yet, bafflingly, we have it, as far as we know, unique. What was done for Kerkyra could have been done for the cities acceding later, but the men responsible may simply have neglected to do what they had done for Kerkyra, *viz* require that ‘the common *stele*’ bear the record. One may compare the variation of form between the Chalkis alliance of 377 (*GHI* 124) and the decree of alliance with Kerkyra, Akarnania and Kephallenia (*GHI* 126). The Chalkis decree ordered (line 15) one copy of the decree to be placed on the Akropolis, no more, and therefore what might seem a duplicate of it (*IG* ii² 155, as reread by Schweigert, *Hesp.* vii [1938] 626) cannot be so, and is like to be, as Schweigert opined, part of a decree about another Euboian state presented on the same day. Why did the Athenians not treat Kerkyra separately as they treated Chalkis separately? The answer is likely that those responsible simply happened not to do so. So it is not necessarily indicative of a great change in Athens’ attitude to the Confederacy that she ceased to record the names of new members.

One may add that there is no evidence that Athens trampled on her principles before Leuktra. A fragmentary decree (*IG* ii² 98, republished most recently by Bengtson, *Staatsverträge* ii no. 267) strongly suggests that there were garrisons on Kephallenia in this period and ‘supervisors’ (ἐπιμεληταί), but this does not prove what at first sight it might seem to. The decree of alliance with Kephallenia (*GHI* 126) spoke of ‘Kephallenians’ without qualification,²⁸ but what was actually recorded on ‘the common *stele*’ was ‘Pronnoi of the Kephallenians’. Something had gone wrong. Timotheos had taken all the cities (Diod. xv 36.5), and when the decree of alliance was drafted it was presumed that all would accept membership of the Confederacy, but only one city in the event did. It was left to Iphikrates in 372 to ‘subject the cities in Kephallenia’ and some were still ‘recalcitrant’ shortly afterwards (Xen. *Hell.* vi 2.33, 38). There was need for garrisons and ‘supervisors’ (which were removed under the Peace of 372/1–*ibid.* vi 4.1). Their presence proves nothing about the Confederacy. One other negative point may be made. There is no justification for assigning to the peace conference of 375 the Hellenic decree recognising Athens’ right to take Amphipolis (Aisch. ii 32). In 374 Athens was free to commence the attempt, but she did not do so until 368 (see below). Not only so, but it

²⁶ It is impossible to connect Nepos *Tim.* 4.2 with anything we know about either Jason or Timotheos, who sailed off to serve under the Great King in early 372 (Dem. xlix 25, 28, 60) not long after his trial. So one need not posit that hostile acts on Jason’s part led to the erasure.

²⁷ As to the erasure of lines 11–13, we cannot

conjecture when it was made since we do not know what was erased.

²⁸ In 189 B.C. there was, it would appear, no *κοινόν* of Kephallenians (Livy xxxviii 28), and there is no reason to suppose that there was one in the fourth century.

would seem that after the Peace of 375 it was widely presumed among those who were available for hire as rowers that there would be no work for them: when in 373 Timotheos was ordered to take out a fleet of sixty triremes, he could not completely man them in the Peiraeus (Xen. *Hell.* vi 2.12);²⁹ if a war for Amphipolis was in prospect, there was every reason for these rowers to stay in Athens. Wherever this decree of the Hellenes is to be put, it is not before 371. Athens did not in the 370s begin to concentrate her energies and policies on the recovery of Amphipolis.

Indeed in the late 370s the Confederacy was flourishing. It attained its largest membership. The *synedrion* was handling the business of the allies under the chairmanship of one of the *synedroi*.³⁰ The allies were taking their share of the war, not just the Thebans (Dem. xlix 14, *IG* ii² 1607.49, 155), but also the Mytilenaians, who in 369/8 were praised because they 'nobly and with the greatest enthusiasm shared in fighting the last war to the finish' (*GHI* 131.37). Contributions (*syntaxeis*) were being paid (Dem. xlix 49). States were still willing to come over to Athens of their own accord (Xen. *Hell.* vi 2.38). At the Peace before Leuktra each individual member swore the oaths (*ibid.* vi 3.19), and the motive alleged by Xenophon for the Athenian summons to the Peace after Leuktra suggests that *vis à vis* her allies in 371 Athens' was a posture of great rectitude (*ibid.* vi 5.1). There are no signs of 'failure' in the 370s.

THE CONTINUATION OF THE CONFEDERACY AFTER LEUKTRA

Athenian desire to recover her fifth century imperial power is a major theme of the fourth. The desire is clear, though the individuals most concerned can be only most tentatively conjectured. But this large topic is here not under discussion. Rather, the concern is with the reaction of members of the Confederacy to Athenian changes of policy.

The Confederacy had been formed to force Sparta to respect the freedom of the Greeks. After Leuktra its *raison d'être* was gone. Sparta was not, nor was she likely in the foreseeable future to be, in a position to menace the liberty of anyone outside the Peloponnese. Late in 370 there came a crisis. The Arcadians appealed to Athens for help against Sparta (Diod. xv 62.3, Dem. xvi 12). Rejected, they appealed to the Thebans who accepted the alliance, and shortly Epameinondas was marching into the Peloponnese at the head of a huge army, which included 'Euboians from all the cities' as well as Akarnanians (Xen. *Hell.* vi 5.23). Thebes had become the champion of Greek liberty, a rôle made the clearer when Athens actually made alliance with Sparta (*ibid.* vi 5.49), and some of the Confederacy were prepared to follow Thebes. But why did not all the members abandon Athens' leadership even if they were in no position, or disinclined, to follow the Thebans?

No echo of any debate survives. But it is to be noted that decisions concerning peace and war were, in the formalities described by the document recording the Kerkyra alliance (*GHI* 127), to be made by Athens only in accordance with the consent of the allied *synedrion*, that the *synedrion* certainly operated in this period (see below; cf. *GHI* 133. 11–13), that therefore it may well have been the case that the Arcadian alliance was turned down, and the Spartan alliance made, with the consent of a majority of the allies. Only states accessible to Theban help, however, could dare to abandon the league, and what the Akarnanians and Euboians did, others may well have wished to do. But, as may be inferred from the tone and terms of the Athenian decree replying to a Mytilenian embassy in 368 (*GHI* 131; for date see below), in winter 370/69 there had been no mass protest against the new Athenian policy, and, before one discusses why the Confederacy declined, one had better ask why it endured, as it would seem, complacently enough.

Why, indeed, did the members continue to pay *syntaxeis* to Athens? Or, rather, if the answer to that question is that Athens forced them to pay, on what pretext did Athens continue to exact?

²⁹ This is striking proof of the great *éclat* of the Peace of 375.

³⁰ Decree in Accame 230.

They had been introduced, probably after 373,³¹ to finance the common effort against Sparta. Now that that effort was a thing of the past, what reason could Athens advance for continuing to exact them, if she was to avoid vexatious wrangling with the allied *synedrion*? The only answer that presents itself seems to be that from 371 *syntaxeis* were regarded as funding Athenian ships policing the Aegean. Such policing was indeed necessary.³² The piracy encountered in the later 350s and the 340s was often used by Philip or against Philip, but it is clear that there were a great number of pirates and that it was necessary to maintain 'the guard by sea', 'the guard against the pirates' ([Dem.] vii 14–15). In the period immediately preceding the foundation of the Confederacy, pirates had made merry (Isok. iv 115), and the Athenian navy was necessary. The navy list of 370/69 (*IG* ii² 1609; see below) attests considerable naval activity before the war for Amphipolis began, and one must imagine that in addition to the scantily attested naval operations of the 360s and 350s 'the guard by sea' was regularly maintained. When Leosthenes was blockading the harbour on Peparethos, he sent out appeals for help to Samos, Thasos and the Hellespont (Polyain. vi 2.1); naval forces based on the two latter is no surprise, but that there were naval forces in Samos in 361 is surprising, and points to widespread routine patrolling.³³ So regular protection against piracy was a considerable advantage. In addition, there were the more organised dangers to navigation presented by the marauding of an Alexander of Pherai or of a hostile neighbour like Kyzikos ([Dem.] l 5), or again by states which in time of corn shortage would interfere with other states' supplies ([Dem.] l 20, 21). There was real advantage for a Tenos, a Prokonnesos or a Maroneia in being able to seek the aid of the Athenian navy. The members of the Confederacy no doubt realised in 370 that they would have to go on paying if they were to be moderately secure.

But there was a more important bond. The Confederacy was in large measure a union of democracies. In the list of the members on the decree of Aristotle two are specially designated 'the *demos* of . . .' The document of alliance with Kerkyra is headed 'Alliance of Kerkyraians and Athenians', but the oaths exchanged make clear it is the two democracies which are exchanging guarantees (*GHI* 127). The chances of epigraphical survival shows us that there was democracy in Andros and Amorgos (*GHI* 152, 156).³⁴ Since in the speech of Kallistratos at Sparta in 371, at least in the version of Xenophon (*Hell.* vi 3.14), every city was divided between supporters of Sparta and supporters of Athens, it is reasonable to suppose that the Confederacy was in large measure homogeneous in constitution. In the *Politics* (1307b19–24) Aristotle asserted a general rule concerning assimilation of constitutions, and he was not concerning himself only with the fifth century when he asserted that 'the Athenians everywhere dissolved oligarchies'.

Thus there were reasons for the Confederacy to cohere, and in addition the members had, as far as we can see, no great reason for discontent with Athens' performance of her promises made at the inception of the Confederacy.

THE SYNEDRION

The working of the *synedrion* is an obscure subject.³⁵ In the treaty of alliance between

³¹ The argument advanced in (5) Cawkwell 91–3 for the introduction of *syntaxeis* after the Peace of 375 lacked cogency, for it depended on the view that members contributed both money and ships, which cannot be proved. However, I adhere to the view that they were introduced after 375: it remains very unlikely that the early alliances would not have made more explicit the distinction between tribute and *syntaxeis*, if they had been introduced early; also the references to Timotheos' campaign of 375 suggest that he did not have money from the allies (Isok. xv 109, Xen. *Hell.* v 4.66, [Ar.] *Econ.* 1350a30).

³² For piracy in the fourth century, cf. E. Ziebarth, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Seeraubs und Seehandels im alten*

Griechenland (Hamburg 1929) 13–19 (evidence quoted 102–4). Although Alexander of Pherai and Philip of Macedon did not have large fleets and so resorted to piratical raids, which Demosthenes does not neglect to remark, professional piracy went on, largely taken for granted by the orators. Cf. esp. Dem. xxiii 166, vii 2, 14–15, xii 2, 13, lviii 56, Aisch. ii 12, 72. Clearly despite the operation of the Athenian navy, the Aegean was a dangerous place. Cf. Accame 137.

³³ [Dem.] l 53 (cf. xvii 20) suggests that there may have been another base at Tenedos.

³⁴ If 'the people and council' of line 20 of the decree in Accame 230 are Parian, Paros is to be added.

³⁵ Discussions prior to Accame—G. Busolt (n. 3)

Athens and Kerkyra (*GHI* 127), from which all discussion of the *synedrion* must proceed, there is a distinction made between procedure in the business of peace and war and procedure in 'the other things'. In the former cases the Athenians and the Kerkyraians both bind themselves to act only in accordance with the joint decision of 'the Athenians and the majority of the allies'. There is no obscurity about this.³⁶ There have survived two inscriptions which make plain the process whereby a decree of the allied *synedrion* is put before the Athenian *demos* with the Athenian council as intermediary (*GHI* 133, 144), and the two speeches of Aischines concerning the making of the Peace of Philokrates fill in the detail (*cf. esp.* ii 60, 61, 85, 86, iii 69–75). As Accame rightly remarked,³⁷ the process is the reverse of what happened in the Peloponnesian League as it is to be seen in the first book of Thucydides, where Sparta proposes and the League assembly disposes. All that is clear. But the procedure in respect of 'the other matters' is not.

The attempt has been made to confine what evidence we have to the strait-jacket of the procedure for making peace and war. By happy chance part of a decree of the allied *synedrion* survives (Accame 230). It is dated by an Attic *archon* and an Attic month. Then 'under the chairmanship of . . . the Theban, it was decided by the allies . . .'. The decree which follows appears to concern the settlement of the internal troubles of Paros, and to match perfectly the phrase in the Athenian decree above it, *viz* 'the settlement (*διαλλαγαί*) which the allies made for (or 'with'—see below) the Parians.' Accame is persuaded that this decree of the allied *synedrion* had been ratified by the Athenian council and the Athenian assembly.³⁸ In this way a most illuminating piece of evidence is plunged into darkness.

The distinction between matters of peace and war and 'the other things' (*τᾶλλα*) made in the Kerkyra alliance must be maintained. The Kerkyraians swear thus: 'Concerning war and peace I will act according to whatever seems good to the Athenians and the majority of the allies (*καθότι κα Ἀθηναίους καὶ τῶι πλήθει τῶν συμμάχων δοκῆι*), and I will do the other things in accordance with the decrees of the Athenians and their allies (*κατὰ τὰ δόγματα τὰ Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων*).' What is behind this distinction? Was not 'whatever seems good to the Athenians and the majority of the allies' 'a decree of the Athenians and their allies'?

I propose that the point of the distinction is that 'the other things' were to be dealt with in accordance with the decrees, the Decrees which in 378 prescribed the working of the Confederacy. One may find confirmation of this view in the Chalkis alliance of early 377 (*GHI* 124), where the phrases of the decree of Aristotle spelling out what freedom and autonomy in the Confederacy meant ('not receiving a garrison from the Athenians, not paying tribute, not admitting an *archon*') are followed by the words, 'contrary to the decrees of the allies'. It is almost inconceivable that at that early date, not many weeks after the grand renunciation of the decree of Aristotle, circumstances were envisaged in which garrisons, tribute, *archontes* might be established in member states with the approval of the allies. What this phrase means in the Chalkis alliance is, I propose, 'in contravention of the Decrees which have constituted the Confederacy.' Later, of course, this sense was not maintained. In a decree of 357/6 (*GHI* 156) provision was made for the garrison in Andros to be paid out of the *syntaxeis* 'in accordance with the decrees of the allies', which refers not to *the* Decrees but to such decrees of the *synedrion* as that by which approval was given to a decree of the people of Arkesine in Amorgos (*GHI* 152.25). But this was twenty years or so after the firm-principled beginnings of the Confederacy, when members had been well aware of *the* Decrees.

Now we do not know what these constituting Decrees were. There may indeed have been quite varied procedures for different matters. In some cases, as in the Parian settlement the allies acted on their own, but in other cases the same procedure as for matters of peace and war may

689–92, and, e.g. V. Martin, *La vie internationale* (Paris 1940) 253–67—did not have to consider the inscription first published by J. H. Oliver, *AJA* xl (1936) 461–4, and republished by Accame with fuller readings (230).

³⁶ But, as Accame 114–15 noted, there is a curious variation between 'the decrees of the allies' in the

Athenian oath and 'the decrees of the Athenians and the allies' in the Kerkyraian oath. Perhaps the full formula would have been for the Athenians an '*inutile pleonasma*'. Perhaps the stone-cutter erred.

³⁷ Accame 119.

³⁸ Accame 231–5.

have been followed, or the reverse procedure, *viz* Athens proposing to the allied *synedrion*, which may be the truth behind how Moirokles is said to have got his decree about the control of piracy passed (Dem. lviii 53–6).³⁹ The presumption that there was a uniform method of procedure in the Confederacy is wholly unjustified. We have decrees of the Athenians ratifying proposals of the allies. We have decrees of the allies and the allies alone. The two groups represent the fundamental distinction drawn in the Kerkyra alliance.

When so much is obscured in the original system, it is practically impossible to say that the Athenians neglected or rode rough-shod over the formal procedure of the Confederacy. As to decisions of peace and war, the *synedrion* certainly continued to play its part as we see it doing in 368, 362/1 and 346 (*GHI* 133, 144, Aisch. ii 60 etc.), and silence is no proof that the allies have been forgotten. For instance, the decree of alliance between Athens and Thessaly of 361/0 (*GHI* 147) carries no statement of the kind found in the alliance with Arcadia (and others) of the previous year (*GHI* 144) about an allied *dogma* being brought before the Athenian council, and so on, but since ‘all the allies of the Athenians are to be allies of the Thessalians’ (line 12) they were probably consulted. One has to be extremely cautious about inferring changes of policy at Athens from changes of form. A supreme instance is provided by the decree of alliance with Dionysios of Syracuse in 368/7, which makes absolutely no mention of the allies (*GHI* 136), but fortunately we have also the earlier decree of mid-368 which makes clear that when Dionysios made the first approach, the response of the Athenian *demos* was to refer the matter to the allied *synedrion*. The correct explanation of why the negotiations went ahead may well be that the *synedrion* signified their approval, and the absence of any mention of the Confederacy in the later document should not be taken to show that Athens was neglecting the allies. The decree begins with a reference to Dionysios’ ‘goodness towards the *demos* of the Athenians and the allies’, and despite the presumptions of epigraphists it is not clear that the *synedroi* did not share in the oaths.⁴⁰ Those who are sceptical about such scepticism should consider what would have been said if lines 57–85 of the Iulis decree of 362 (*GHI* 142) had not survived. Those lines show that Athens’ allies shared in the making and swearing of the first settlement. Lines 17–19 speak only of ‘the oaths and the treaty which Chabrias made with the Keians and swore to’. Had it not been for the survival of the later part, we would no doubt have been told that by 362 Athens had virtually ceased to bother about the Confederacy and its formal procedures. Thus in decisions of matters of peace and war a somewhat negative judgement is to be made. There is no good reason for asserting that Athens ceased to heed the *synedrion* of the Confederacy.

With regard to ‘the other things’, one is even less able to make any positive judgement. As I have already argued, we do not know what or how variable the procedures were. So it is absurd even to ask whether they were neglected. A superficial case can be made by comparing the *dogma* of the allies of 372 (Accame 230) with the Iulis decree of 362 (*GHI* 142); which might suggest that earlier the allies settled revolts without the Athenians having any say, whereas by the late 360s Athens was intervening vigorously in such matters. But it is highly dubitable whether the allied *dogma* of 372 is the settlement of a revolt rather than of internal disturbances. It is described in the Athenian decree which orders its publication as ‘the settlement (*διαλλαγάς*) which the allies made for the Parians’,⁴¹ and the *dogma* begins, not with any statement about Paros returning to loyalty and membership of the Confederacy, but with regulations concerning the maintenance of civil order. Thus it is quite wrong to speak of this allied *dogma* as proof that the allies were managing revolt on their own in the 370s. Indeed the Athenian decree, to which the *dogma* is appended, appears to concern the Parians alone, or, at any rate, the Parians especially, since in line 6 the reference to ‘colonists’ is probably to the Parians. If we had that full decree,

³⁹ Cf. Accame 124.

⁴⁰ If lines 23 and 27 can have one letter short, so can line 34 and instead of *τοῦ[ς ταξιάρχους]* we could read *τοῦ[ς συμμάχους]*, or *τοῦ[ς συνέδρους]*. (It seems unlikely that the aorist, rather than the familiar present

ὄπλα ἐπιφέρειν, was used in lines 23 and 27, *pace* D. M. Lewis, *CQ* xi [1961] 64 n.1.)

⁴¹ The translation is uncertain, but for the sense ‘with the Parians’ one would expect *πρὸς Παρίους*, as e.g. Dem. ii 1.

more of a comparison with the Iulis decree might have been properly and profitably made. As things are, all one can assert is that we are in no position to assert that Athens neglected the formal procedures laid down in the early days of the Confederacy.

THE GROWTH OF IMPERIAL INSTITUTIONS

It is a commonplace that Athens did not renege on her undertaking of 377 not to settle cleruchies in the territory of those who chose to be members of the Confederacy, and this is probably correct. We know for sure of only two cleruchies, those to Samos and Poteidaia, neither of which were members. Another cleruchy has been alleged on the strength of an entry in the navy-list for 370/69 (*IG* ii² 1609), but the fact that eleven triremes sailed out 'during the cleruchic command' (*κληρουχαρχόντων*) of two persons does not prove that this was a new cleruchy; probably annually from 387/6 on, 'cleruchic commanders' went out to Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros with some ships, though only for 370/69 was the fact recorded on a bit of stone that has chanced to survive (*cf.* *Arist. Ath. Pol.* 62.2).⁴² So until more solid evidence turns up we will have to content ourselves with the two cleruchies mentioned, though it must be remarked that it is only by chance of epigraphic survival that we know of the cleruchy to Poteidaia. The Samian cleruchy, as the first, raised a serious question of principle and was perhaps tensely debated (*Arist. Rhet.* 1384b32–5). The Poteidaian colony seems to have been by invitation of some sort (*GHI* 146. 5, 10) and left no mark in our literary sources, and there may well have been others.⁴³ But as yet, there is no reason to think that the promise of the decree of Aristotle was not kept.

Other infringements of autonomy, however, there certainly were. There is considerable uncertainty about *syntaxeis*. We never hear precisely of such monies being brought to Athens, and there are a number of precise pieces of evidence of Athenian generals collecting in the course of operations.⁴⁴ Indeed when Demosthenes asserted that the generals 'with one or two ships take less money, those with a great force take more' (viii 25), he may, while hitting at the rapacity of the generals, have given the clue to what the system was, *viz* that commanders could draw their expenses on campaign from members, up to an assessed amount.⁴⁵ In this way it could be claimed that, unlike the fifth century empire, the Confederacy gathered money only for services rendered (*Dem. loc. cit.*).⁴⁶ But the outcome was much the same. In the early 340s the collection was annual (*Aisch.* ii 71), and no doubt in the 350s and 360s, for Athens was continually at war. Reluctant states were threatened and pillaged by generals less scrupulous than a Timotheos or a Phokion (*Isok.* xv 123, *Plut. Phok.* 7, 11). Compulsion produced resentment (*Isok.* viii 29).

As to those other imperial instruments foresworn at the foundation of the Confederacy, garrisons and governors (*archontes*), the evidence is slight. From late 362 ([*Dem.*] 15) to the end of the Social War, the islands of the Aegean were in danger and needed the reinforcement of a garrison, and the two inscriptions we have reflecting the relations of governors and member states suggest some cordiality (*GHI* 152, 156). The garrison on Andros is dated to 357/6, but there is no firm indication of when Androtion was governor on Amorgos, though the ransoming of prisoners of war with which he is credited (*GHI* 152. 15) suggests the period of Alexander of Pherai's depredations. Timarchos, the associate of Demosthenes, however, would

⁴² *Cf.* (8) Cawkwell, *pace* (9) Griffith 312 n. 34.

⁴³ However, the cleruchs sent to Methone by Accame (183) on the strength of D. M. Robinson *TAPA* lxix (1938) 58 belong to the fifth century (*cf.* *SEG* x no. 67).

⁴⁴ *Isok.* xv 123; *Plut. Phok.* 7, 11; *IG* ii² 207, with [*Dem.*] 153 and *GHI* 168; possibly *GHI* 156 in the light of 152.

⁴⁵ *GHI* 175, if rightly supplemented in line 27 f.,

shows that assessment was the work of the *synedrion*. The situation behind [*Dem.*] lviii 37, 38 is unclear; perhaps the Ainians made an agreement with Chares about the amount they should contribute because special circumstances prevented payment of the full amount assessed.

⁴⁶ So Kallistratos (*FGrH* 115 F 98) was not being merely cynical in using a new name for the thing in some degree new.

appear to have been governor in Andros at some time in the 360s (Aisch. i 107).⁴⁷ So the garrison and governor of 357/6 was perhaps not an innovation in the Social War, and, slight though the evidence is, it suggests that the reversion to fifth century methods of control may have been quite widespread. Whether Athens sought to revive the full judicial system is quite unsure. Certainly part was revived (cf. *GHI* 142. 73–5, *IG* ii² 179), but of the notorious imperial control of ‘political’ cases there is no mention whatsoever.⁴⁸

It may be confidently enough asserted that in the 360s the Confederacy was in no small measure converted into something resembling the earlier empire. Only cleruchies (and investment and property) in the territory of member states were avoided. Yet curiously the only good evidence we have about the outbreak of the Social War concerns not member states but Athens’ overseas possessions.

THE OUTBREAK OF THE SOCIAL WAR

In the speech *On the liberty of the Rhodians* Demosthenes gave an account of the outbreak of the Social War thus (§3): ‘The Chians, the Byzantines, and the Rhodians accused us of plotting against themselves, and for this reason they joined us in this last war. The man who took the leading part and persuaded them will be found to be Mausolos . . .’ Later in the speech (§15) he reverts to the matter: ‘Having resented you getting back what belongs to you (τοῦ κομίσασθαι τὰ ὑμέτερον ὑμῖν φθονήσαντες), they (sc. the Rhodians) have lost their own liberty.’ This is the sum total of the direct evidence, save for the *Hypothesis* of Isokrates’ oration, *On the Peace*, which begins thus: ‘Chares was sent to enslave Amphipolis which was autonomous in that period and stood on its own since the Spartans were in a bad way after the Leuktra campaign and the Athenians were weak. Thinking that he would easily capture it some time or other, and wanting to recreate for the Athenians their former power, Chares made an attempt on the Chians and the Rhodians and the rest of the allies (ἐπεχείρησε Χίους καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς συμμαχοῖς). Thereupon they resisted and Chares was defeated . . .’

Chares sailed in to Athens during the Athenian expedition to liberate Euboia in summer 357⁴⁹ and was despatched as ‘fully empowered’ general, to the Chersonese, where he engaged in negotiations with the Thracian kings which resulted in a treaty (Dem. xxiii 173). So the *Hypothesis* is simply wrong about Chares’ original mission. Secondly, the resistance of the Chians and the Rhodians to the ‘attempt’ of Chares appears to have been, in the writer’s mind, the battle of Chios, and he has failed to distinguish the opening of the war from its cause. Thirdly, there is hardly likely to be any solid information behind Chares’ alleged ‘attempt’, since, according to Demosthenes (xv 3), the Athenians were accused of hostile designs, not of a hostile act. So the *Hypothesis* is, historically speaking, worthless, and we are thrown back on the two statements of Demosthenes.

‘Getting back what belongs to you’ (τὸ κομίσασθαι τὰ ὑμέτερα) is at first sight a somewhat obscure phrase, but there is a reasonable presumption that Demosthenes was referring to the

⁴⁷ In 106–12 Aischines treated of Timarchos’ career in offices chosen by lot. It is not provable, but it looks as if the treatment is in chronological order, for there seems no other explanation of the order.

⁴⁸ Cf. Accame 138–42. (The inscription published by A. G. Woodhead in *Hesp.* xxvi [1957] 231 is of dubitable significance.)

⁴⁹ For the dating of the outbreak of the Social War, cf. *Class. et Med.* xxii (1962) 34–40. Precise dating of the Euboian expedition is not beyond conjecture. At the time oaths were sworn to the Karystians by the Council of 357/6, embassies to the Euboian states had only just been paid their expenses (*GHI* 153). So unless there was

a considerable lapse of time between the expulsion of the Thebans and the re-entry of the Euboian cities into the Confederacy (which seems unlikely), the operations were over by the start of 357/6 or shortly after. For it must be noted that the naval expedition to Euboia (Aisch. iii 85) and the departure of Chares for the Hellespont during the Athenian operations (Dem. xxiii 173) which lasted less than thirty days (Aisch. *loc. cit.*) show that the Etesian winds had not begun. The Etesians blow fairly steadily from mid-June. So if one puts the Euboian expedition in the second to last or the last month of 358/7, one is, at the worst, probably not greatly in error.

Athenian efforts to recover Amphipolis and the Chersonese. Elsewhere he speaks of 'getting back Amphipolis' or 'getting back the Chersonese' and on the three other occasions when he speaks of 'getting back what belongs to you' he appears to refer to Amphipolis, the Chersonese having been recovered by 352.⁵⁰ The other possibility, which cannot be ruled out, is that he is referring to what Isokrates (viii 6) described as 'the possessions in the cities' (*τὰς κτήσεις ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι*)—'the war party lead us to expect both that we will get back the possessions in the cities and that we will recover our former power.' Certainly 'the Chersonese, the colonies, the possessions (*ἐγκτήματα*), the monies on loan' had been linked together by Andokides (iii 15) a generation earlier, as being what Athens desired to recover, and the foreswearing of 'possessions' in the decree of Aristotle for the sake of making the Confederacy as large as possible (Isok. xiv 44) had clearly not rid the Athenians of their desire, as Isokrates (viii 6) shows. So it is not impossible that by 'what belongs to you' Demosthenes meant not just Amphipolis and the Chersonese but all of Athens' fifth-century overseas assets, in which case all the members of the Confederacy could well have trembled and those with the naval power and the support of the Carian dynast have revolted. But this seems the less likely meaning. Demosthenes speaks of the allies 'resenting' (*φθονήσαντες*), which would be an odd choice of word if what Demosthenes meant by 'what belongs to you' was what he well knew the members of the Confederacy thought belonged to themselves. So I propose that by the phrase 'getting back what belongs to you' Demosthenes was alluding to the Athenian efforts to recover Amphipolis and the Chersonese.

The precise moment when the Athenians got a Congress of Hellenes to recognise Athens' right to Amphipolis is unsure and there seems little point in reopening the debate. It is sure, however, that the operations began in early 368,⁵¹ and there is some reason to suppose that there was considerable disquiet among the members of the Confederacy. As already remarked, the first crisis of winter 370/69 had caused a number of defections (see above), but it is very curious that when the Mytilenaians, clearly puzzled by the change in Athenian policy towards the Spartans, sent an embassy to Athens to demand explanation, they sent it not in 369 but in 368.

GHI 131 is a decree of the Athenian *demos* of the seventh prytany of 368/7, i.e. spring 367. It orders (lines 20–2) the republication of the decree passed in answer to the Mytilenaiian embassy led by one Hieroitas, and this republished decree is preserved at the foot of the *stèle*. It was proposed by Kallistratos who had played a leading part in the affairs of the Confederacy and had also proposed the expedition to help Sparta in winter 370/69 (Dem. lix 27), and was clearly designed to reassure the Mytilenaiians. It is not dated by more than the archon's name, but it looks as if the two lots of Athenian ambassadors sent to Mytilene (lines 24, 31) had gone as a consequence of the Mytilenaiian demand. If the diplomatic exchanges are not to be improbably spread out over two years, the decree of Kallistratos must be put in 368, and preferably as late in 369/8 as possible. Even then the delay in the completion of the exchanges is odd, or, rather, would be, had winter and the closed sailing season not intervened.

Why then did the Mytilenaeans not make their protest in 369, when explanation was very much needed? It is a guess, but perhaps a tolerable one, that their real disquiet was caused not just by the reversal of policy towards Sparta but also by the spectacle of Athens again engaged in the struggle to get back that most precious imperial asset, Amphipolis. *Syntaxis* continued to be collected, and the seas rendered safe, but at a time when, for all we know, Athens had ceased to expand the Confederacy and was setting out on the long (and ruinous) war for Amphipolis, it would not be clear to members what exactly they were or were not paying for, in a Confederacy that had lost its *raison d'être*, to a hegemon whose principles were no longer beyond question.

The next disenchantment came with the decision to send a cleruchy to Samos. That tense debate (see above) was shortly followed by Epameinondas' persuading the Thebans to aspire to

⁵⁰ Cf. xxiii 14, ii 28; xxiii 153, 156, 158, 161; viii 36, Philip, I take to refer to Amphipolis.

iv 7, both of which, in the context of the war with ⁵¹ Cf. Beloch *Gr. Ges.* iii².2 246–7.

naval hegemony,⁵² and in the light of what happened in 357, his appeal to Rhodes, Chios and Byzantium (Diod. xv 79.1) shows that the Confederacy was in his view ripe for dismemberment. His plans were frustrated by more urgent demands in Greece itself, but clearly given the opportunity there would be revolts. In 363/2 Keios had to be dealt with (*GHI* 142). In 361/0 there was trouble in Kerkyra, and Chares had to be sent to deal with it (Diod. xv 95.3), which he did with great ruthlessness and, it would seem, by overturning the constitution.⁵³ The crisis could not be long delayed. Athenian imperialism was becoming ever more menacing as Athens herself became even poorer.

By the end of the Social War Athens was nearly bankrupt.⁵⁴ The city's revenues were down to the impossibly low total of 130 talents (Dem. x 37), and the economic life of the city was at a low ebb, as Isokrates' *De Pace* and Xenophon's *De Vectigalibus* show.⁵⁵ Particularly significant is the fact that there were unoccupied dwellings and vacant building sites, a large proportion of the metic population having left the city. The mines were in large measure unworked. A measure of the crisis is the appearance of the *De Vectigalibus* which expounded, if with some naïvety, the radical idea that the way to regain prosperity was by peace.

Such a state of affairs was not produced within the brief span of the Social War, possibly a matter of no more than twenty months, and one should appreciate that, when Isokrates blamed the economic condition of Athens on the war (viii 19), he was thinking not merely of the Social War but of the whole of Athens' military effort since the war for Amphipolis began in 368. His argument is directed to secure not just the ratification of the peace with the revolted allies of the Social War but the establishment of peace everywhere (16) which would, he considers, be more likely to get back Amphipolis and the Chersonese for Athens (22). He was opposing himself to the views of those 'who summon you to the war' (5), by which he could not mean the Social War which was virtually over as he wrote (*cf.* 16). He meant the war which had been in progress for over a decade and for which mercenaries were employed (44–6) at sorry cost to the city (*cf.* vii 9).⁵⁶ Isokrates was blaming thirteen years of war for Athens' impoverishment, and rightly. A city of the magnitude of Athens was not so impoverished within the brief span of the Social War.

The doctrine was dear to the Athenian demagogues that the way to prosperity was to gain empire and live off its profits, principally tribute.⁵⁷ Against such a view Isokrates directed his oration *De Pace*; the war policy had not worked, he argued, and it was time to follow the example of prosperous but politically unambitious Megara (117). Similarly, Xenophon's *De Vectigalibus* (1.1) argued against the view of 'certain of Athens' political leaders' who declared that they were obliged to follow a less just policy with regard to 'the cities'⁵⁸ because of 'the poverty of the mass of citizens', and his aim is to suggest ways in which Athens could recover prosperity by exploiting her own resources in place of seeking to grab other peoples'. Thus both these works show what was the prevailing mood of the 360s, and as the economic condition of Athens approached its nadir in 355, the pressure for the 'unjust' policy which would produce imperial profits may be supposed to have increased. The Samian cleruchy in 365 occasioned a tense debate. The heavy-handed intervention of Chares in Kerkyra in 361/0 was the matter of bitter denunciation by the members of the Confederacy (Diod. xv 95.3); Chares had assisted 'the rich and the oligarchic' in their uprising against the *demos* (Aen. Tact. 11.13) and Athens' allies had good reason to complain. The denunciations continued (*cf.* Isok. viii 125, 142), and so did

⁵² Cf. CQ xxii (1972) 271–3.

⁵³ The Ephoran version of Diodoros is the best evidence we have, but Aeneas Tacticus 11.13, which is garbled, reflects the constitutional change. Cf. Xen. *Hell.* v 4.64, where the seemingly gratuitous commendation of Timotheos' conduct in western waters in 375 is, I suppose, a comment on Chares' very different conduct in 361/0.

⁵⁴ Cf. *JHS* lxxxiii (1963) 61–3.

⁵⁵ Isok. viii 19–21, 46, 47, 69, 124, 128. Cf. Dem. xiii 27.

⁵⁶ Cf. Dem. iii 28 with Schol., xiii 27, Aisch. ii 71.

⁵⁷ Note esp. Thuc. vi 24.3. (*Hell. Oxy.* 6.3 and Ar. *Ecl.* 195–8 are the stock passages.)

⁵⁸ 'The cities' is the fifth century term for the subject cities of the Empire. Cf. P. Gauthier, *Un commentaire historique des Poroi de Xénophon* (Geneva 1976) 40.

Chares. Kerkyra once useful in the war against Sparta was now good for nothing but payment. Poverty required imperialism.

In the late 360s the economic decline of Athens was heightened by a general shortage of corn throughout the Greek world. Our only precise information comes from Apollodoros' speech about his trierarchy in 362/1 and 361/0, which deals only with the areas in which he operated, *viz* the coast of Thrace and the Bosphorus. It emerges that not only were Byzantium, Kalchedon, Kyzikos, Maroneia and Stryme having difficulty in securing an adequate supply of corn but also in Attica itself in 361 the drought was so severe that the crops failed and the water supply as well (§61). So it must have been a time of especial hardship in Athens. In 357 things were either worse or at least as bad. In his speech *Against Leptines* which was delivered in 355/4, Demosthenes spoke of 'a corn shortage throughout the human race the year before last' (33), i.e. in 357/6, and since it was normally by the autumn that the supplies were proven adequate or inadequate for the rest of the Attic year, the shortage was probably in 357. Whether it began in 357 or earlier is unclear. Demosthenes was recording the services of the Spartocid dynasty to Athens rather than the recent history of the corn-supply. The years intervening between the drought in Attica in 361 and the general shortage of 357 may all have been years of shortage, like the great corn shortage of 330 to 326 which was felt all over the Greek world.⁵⁹

Such economic difficulties must have accelerated the general economic decline and spurred the imperialist war-party on to demanding action. The despatch of Chares in 361 and, it would seem, his immunity despite loud complaints, gave the allies grounds for fear. What he had done at Kerkyra he would do elsewhere, and when in summer 357 he was sent out to conduct the war for the Chersonese, the allies had only to fear for themselves if he succeeded there. Chares indeed became or was made into a bogey. According to Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1417a32), Isokrates' speech *De Pace* was in large measure an attack on him.⁶⁰ He is not named in it, but plainly enough alluded to (55); the slanders against the city, twice mentioned (125, 142) are presumably due to his work (*cf.* Diod. xv 95.3). The politician who used and defended him, Aristophon, was influential in this period.⁶¹ He proposed the decrees for the settlement of Keios in 362 (*GHI* 142), for the despatch of the fleet in the autumn of that year ([Dem.] 16). Who was responsible for the sending of reinforcements for the cleruchy in Samos in 361/0 (Schol. Aisch. i 53) is unknown. But the purpose can be guessed. Athens was sinking, economically speaking. The bilge-water had to be drawn off. The imperialists knew only one course, return to the glorious and profitable past (Isok. viii 36).

In 357 the allies' chance came. The Athenians were engaged in Euboea. With Philip's seizure of Amphipolis, there were new complications in the war in the north (Diod. xvi 7.2, 8.2). Mausolos of Caria promised his support, and Byzantium and Rhodes, astride two of Athens' corn-routes, persuaded Chios and made their bid for liberty. When it was all over, all that remained was, in Aischines' phrase (ii 71), a few 'wretched islanders'.

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⁵⁹ Cf. *GHI* 196 and comm.

⁶⁰ The title in Aristotle is the *Symmachikos*, which is the alternative title given for the speech in one manuscript.

⁶¹ Cf. Schol. Aisch. i 64, Din. iii 17 and Diod. xvi 21.4 for the connection, and [Dem.] 16 and *GHI* 142 for his prominence.